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Real Parties in Interest David C. Flory and F. Chris Garcia
respectfully ask the Court to summarily dismiss the State's Sealed Verified
Petition for Peremptory Writ of Superintending Control (Petition) on the

grounds that (1) having been filed nearly three months after entry of the
order at issue, the Petition is untimely, (2) the Grand Jury Judge acted well
within his authority in ordering the State to properly instruct the Grand Jury
on the law applicable to the offenses charged, and (3) the instruction at issue
correctly states current New Mexico law.!
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 19,2011, the state filed a complaint charging David C. Flory

with 40 counts of promoting prostitution, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-94(A). See Petition, Ex. 2(A). The charges were based upon Dr. Flory's alleged

management of a website, Vf''\''iv.southwestcomIJanions.infi), which the
complaint describes as an online message board where alleged prostitutes and
patrons discussed various prostitution-related topics. The complaint
explained that the charges were premised on the legal theory that Dr. Flory
"is promoting prostitution by providing the virtual house in which the

1 Dr.

Flory and Dr. Garcia also ask the Court to deny the state's request for a
stay, which is raised for the first time in the Petition's prayer for relief. See
Petition at 12. There are no pending proceedings in district court and, thus, a
stay is unnecessary.
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prostitutes reside, as well as protecting this 'house' by making all new
members verifY that they are not law enforcement." fd at 9 (emphasis added).
On June 2, 2012, Dr. Flory and Dr. Chris Garcia received notice that
they were the targets of a Grand Jury Investigation scheduled for June 18,
2012. See Petition, Ex. 2(B). The notices stated that the state sought to indict

them on two substantive offenses and corresponding conspiracies. The
substantive offenses are (1) "Promoting Prostitution (Establishing, Owning,
Maintaining or Managing a House of Prostitution), occurring on or between
the i h day of May, 2010, and the 19 th day ofJune, 2011, contrary to §30-904.A, NMSA 1978," and (2) "Promoting Prostitution (Procuring a Prostitute
for House of Prostitution), occurring on or between the ih day of May,
2010, and the 19th day of June, 2011, contrary to §30-9-04.C, NMSA 1978."
Given the target notice essentially alleged the same offenses as the
complaint, Dr. Flory had reason to believe the state sought to indict him
based on its legal theory that a website can constitute a "virtual house of
prostitution" within the meaning of New Mexico law. Dr. Flory then filed a
motion, which Dr. Garcia joined, asking the Grand Jury Judge to require the
state to instruct the grand jury that a website or internet message board is not
"a house of prostitution or place where prostitution is practiced, encouraged
or allowed," and to prohibit the state from suggesting the contrary. Petition,

2
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Ex. 2. Dr. Flory did not ask the court to dismiss the state's case, to limit the
state's evidence or to prohibit the state from seeking an indictment. Id. at 3.
The state filed a written response to the motion, and the district court
heard argument on June 15,2012. See Petition, Exs. 3-4. On June 18,2012,
the district court entered an order requiring the prosecution to instruct the
grand jury as follows:
The Court has made a ruling that a website, online message board or
computer is not a "house of prostitution or a place where prostitution
is practiced, encouraged or allowed" within the meaning [of] NMSA
1978, § 30-9-4.
Petition, Ex. 5. Nearly three months after the district court entered its order,
and over two months after the transcript of the hearing had been prepared,

see Petition, Ex. 4 at 57, the state filed a petition challenging the order.
II.

ARGUMENT
A. Having been filed nearly 87 days after the Grand Jury Judge
Issued His Order, the Petition for Peremptory Writ of
Superintending Control is Untimely.

The Honorable Stan Whitaker issued his order on June 18,2012. On
September 12, 2012-86 days after the order was issued-the state filed its
Petition asking this Court to vacate Judge Whitaker's order. Because the
state's writ is the functional equivalent of an appeal, it is untimely.
A writ of superintending control is taken when a party believes that a
simple appeal will not adequately resolve an issue. This Court "has held that
3

Pg

I~-Z~

~m:My~ax

- MarK H. tarnest

IO:KObert

J.

Gorence

(1~~~Zqq~HHH)

I~:ZZ ~~/ZI/IZ t~1

the writ of superintending control is appropriate when the remedy by appeal
seems wholly inadequate ,.. or where otherwise necessary to prevent
irreparable mischief, great, extraordinary, or exceptional hardship; costly
delays and unusual burdens of expense." In re Extradition ofMartinez,
2001-NMSC-009, ~ 12, 130 N.M. 144,20 P.3d 126 (citations omitted),
quoting State ex rei. Transco/1. Bus Serv, v. Carmody, 53 KM. 367, 378, 208
P.2d 1073, 1080 (1949). Even though a writ of superintending control is not

per se an appeal, in this case, it serves the same purpose as an appeal. In fact,
the State's Petition in this case is the functional equivalent ofan appeal, and
the right to an appeal is preserved by filing a notice of appeal within thirty
days of the judgment. See NMRA Rule 12·201(A)(2) (emphasis added).

An appeal taken outside of the thirty-day time limit is untimely, and
"an untimely appeal will not be excused when the appellant is responsible
for not filing a notice of appeal on time and there are no unusual
circumstances warranting excusal." Santa Fe Pac. Trust; Inc. v. City of
Albuquerque, 2012 WL 3711502, *10; see also San Juan J990-A., IP v. E1

Paso Prod. Co.,

2002~NMCA~041, ~

12,26, 132 N.M. 73,43 PJd 1083

(refusing to excuse an untimely filing when counsel filed a notice ofappeaJ
one day late, believing that the clerk's office was closed the day the appeal
was due). An untimely appeal should only be heard if (1) there is a court-

4
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caused delay, (2) unusual circumstances are present, or (3) the appeal is only
marginally untimely. Chavez v. U-Haul Co. ofNM, 1997-NMSC-051, '1[
26, 124 N.M. 165,947 P.2d 122.
Similarly, the timeline to file a petition for writ of certiorari is also
thirty days. See NMRA Rule 12-505(C); see also Wakeland v. NM Dep't of

Workforce Solutions and Gilman Law Offices, LLC, 2012-NMCA-021, ~'lf
18-22, 274 PJd 766. Much like an appeal, the untimely filing of such a writ
will only be excused in unusual circumstances outside the control of the
parties. Wakeland, 20 12-NMCA-02 1, "23-26; see also Trujillo v. Serrano,
117 N.M. 273, 278, 871 P.2d 361,374 (1994) (allowing an untimely appeal
as long as the untimeliness was due to judicial error). An untimely petition
for certiorari has also been allowed on the basis that it was only marginally
late, and where exigent circumstances existed. See Chavez, 1997-NMSC051, ~4f 21-22 (appeal should be allowed because the notice of appeal was
filed only fifty-eight minutes late, the party was pro se, and the late pro se
filing was partly a result of trial counsel's indecision on whether to represent
the client on appeal). In that same case, however, the Court declined to
extend the exception to another appellant where no unusual circumstances
existed to cause him to file his appeal thirty days late.ld

5

~'\[
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Beeause the petition for a writ of superintending eontrol in this ease is
the functional equivalent of an appeal, the deadlines applicable to an appeal
should apply. Further, the conditions warranting acceptance of an untimely
appeal are not met in this case. The Petition was filed 86 days after the
district court's order and a full two months after the completion ofthe
transcript of the relevant hearing. The Petition contains no new arguments
that were not briefed and argued below. Although the transcript is attached,
the Petition does not cite to it. Under the circumstances, there is no reason
the state could not have filed its Petition within (or even close to) 30 days
after Judge Whitaker issued his ruling.
Although the state acknowledges that this case raises an "issue of first
impression [that] is important to the public and should be resolved quickly,"
Petition at 4, it waited nearly three months before challenging Judge
Whitaker's order. As a result, Dr. Flory and Dr. Garcia have suffered much
prejudice. Both men were first implicated in this case approximately 14
months ago. Since that time, Dr. Garcia's and Dr. Flory's reputations have
been thoroughly sullied, and Dr. Garcia was dismissed from his UNM
position. Further, due to the unjustified delays by the state, Dr. Garcia and
Dr. Flory have been unable to finally and conclusively clear their names.
This type of delay and practice must be curtailed.

6
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A delay of 86 days is inexcusable, especially when the state itself
acknowledged the need for a speedy resolution of this matter. The filing of
the petition is untimely and has caused both Dr. Flory and Dr. Garcia harm.

As such, the state's petition should be summarily denied.
B. Judge Whitaker Not Only Had the Authority, But Also the Duty,
to Order the State to Properly Instruct the Grand Jury on the
Law Relevant to the Offenses to Be Considered.
Should this Court find that the State's Petition is timely, it should
nonetheless dismiss it on the merits. In its Petition, the state argues that the
Grand Jury Judge lacked authority to "rule on a pre-indictment Foulenfont
motion without any stipulated facts." Petition at 6. The fundamental flaw in
the State's argument is that the district court made no such ruling. The
district court did not dismiss the state's case, and it did not in any way
restrict the state's presentation of evidence to the grand jury or the charges
the state chose to present. Rather, the court ordered the state to correctly
instruct the grand jury on the law applicable to the offenses the grand jury
was being asked to consider. See Petition, Ex. 5. Such an order was clearly
within the court's authority. See NMRA Rule 5-302A(B)(4).
The State's Petition suggests that a grand jury judge's supervisory
authority is limited to resolving disputes between the prosecution and
defense regarding the presentation of evidence. Petition at 6-7. This is simply

7
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not true. Rule 5-302A also requires a grand jury judge to decide disputes
regarding the instructions to be provided to the grand jury. Rule 5-302A(C)
requires the prosecution to "provide the grand jurors with instructions setting
forth the elements of each offense being investigated and the definitions of

any defenses raised by the evidence" and to "provide the grand jury with
other instructions which are necessary to the fair consideration by the grand

jury of the issues presented." (Emphasis added.) A prosecutor may be
relieved ofthe duty to instruct the grand jury on possible defenses only "by
obtaining a court order prior to the grand jury proceeding." Rule 5302A(B)(4). Following briefing by the parties, a grand jury judge must "give
the prosecuting attorney clear direction on how to proceed before the grand

jury, making a record of the decision." fd. In entering his order requiring the
state to properly instruct the grand jury on the applicable law, Judge
Whitaker did exactly what the law required and authorized him to do.
There is no question that the grand jury judge "has the power and
obligation to assist the grand jury in carrying out its functions." Jones v.

Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ~ 30, 145 N.M. 473, 200 PJd 523. The district
court is endowed with supervisory authority over the grand jury to ensure its
proper functioning. See id at ~ 13 ("A court would not be justified, even if it
were so inclined, to create or call into existence a grand jury, and then go off

8
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and leave it. A supervisory duty, not only exists, but is imposed upon the
court, to see that its grand jury and its process are not abused, or used for
purposes of oppression and injustice"), quoting In re Nat '1 Window Glass
Workers, 287 F. 219, 225 (ND. Ohio 1922); Cookv. Smith, 114 N.M. 41,

44-45,834 P.2d 418, 421-22 (1992); NMRA Rule 5-302A(F)(1) ("The
district court has supervisory authority over all grand jury proceedings.").
This supervisory authority extends to ensuring that the grand jury's scope of
inquiry is limited to investigating criminal conduct under New Mexico law.
See District Court v. McKenna, 118 N.M. 402, 407, 881 P.2d 1387, 1392

(1994) ("[I]fthe petition [to convene a grand jury] alleges conduct that is not
proscribed by New Mexico law, inquiry into such conduct historically falls
outside the purview of the grand jury."); Cook, 114 N.M. at 45,834 P.2d at
422 ("Clearly a grand jury cannot be convened to investigate conduct that is
not proscribed by New Mexico law[.]"). By ordering the state to properly
instruct the grand jury on the applicable law, Judge Whitaker did no more
than ensure that the grand jury acted within its legal authority.
In addition to arguing that a grand jury judge lacks authority to
resolve legal disputes prior to a grand jury presentation, the state also
suggests that Judge Whitaker exceeded his authority in interpreting the
relevant statute because the legal issue presented is "novel." Petition at 4.

9
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This argument is meritless. District court judges routinely decide novel
questions of law-it is one their most fundamental functions in our justice
system. Many important legal issues would never reach this Court if district
court judges were prohibited from considering novel questions. Further, in
this case, it was the state that sought to apply a novel-and legally
unsustainable-interpretation of a long-standing statute, and Judge Whitaker
was well within his authority in deciding whether that interpretation was
consistent with New Mexico law. "In matters relating to the grand jury
process, the prosecutor does not have discretion, and the courts do not defer
to any decision the prosecutor makes if that decision is not in compliance
with the law." State v. Yaw, 2011-NMCA-023,

~

11, 150 N.M. 279, 258

P.3d 1071.
Finally, the state's characterization of Judge Whitaker's order as Ii
ruling on a pre-indictment Foulerifont motion evinces a misunderstanding of
the order and of Dr. Flory's citation to Foulerifont in his briefing before the
district court. See Petition, Ex. 2. Dr. Flory cited to State v. Foulenfont, 119
N.M. 788, 895 P.2d 1329 (Ct. App. 1995), solely to illustrate the differences
between legal and factual issues. Petition, Ex. 4 at 18. Similarly, he cited to
the facts alleged in the complaint solely as the basis for his belief that the
state intended to seek indictment under the "virtual house of prostitution"

10
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legal theory. Id., Ex. 4 at 8. He never asked the court to impose Foulenfont's
remedy of dismissing the state's case. Furthermore, as Dr. Flory noted in his
motion and during argument, the contents of the website or his computer are
irrelevant to the legal issue presented here. And it is noteworthy that
nowhere in its pleadings or arguments to the district court or in its Petition to
this Court has the state denied its intent to proceed under the "virtual house
of prostitution" legal theory.
C. Judge Whitaker Correctly Construed the Applicable Statute.
The state sought indictments against Dr. Flory and Dr. Garcia for
alleged violations ofNMSA 1978, § 30-9-4(A) and (C) (1981), which
criminalize certain conduct in relation to "a house of prostitution or ... place
where prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed." The issue in this
case is what the Legislature meant by the phrase "place where prostitution is
practiced, encouraged or allowed" and whether this phrase can fairly be read
to include websites, internet message boards, and computers. Judge
Whitaker correctly concluded it cannot.
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the tools of the
internet-including websites, chat rooms and message boards-are methods
of communication "located in no partiCUlar geographical location but
available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet."

11
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Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 US. 844, 851 (1997). Similarly,

computers are simply tools used to access cyberspace and store information.
They are no more "places" than telephones, typewriters and letters. The
statutory provisions Dr. Flory and Dr. Garcia allegedly violated do not speak

to communications (or tools of communication) but to the management of
physical places where the crime of prostitution occurs.
As Dr. Flory argued below (Petition, Ex. 2 at 5-15), the plain language

of the: stlltlltr.-IlUO common mlr.s of statlltory constmction-m61kr. r.lr.Af thAt
the Legislature intended only to prohibit certain conduct with respect to
buildings and other structures in which the crime of prostitution that is,
"knowingly engaging in or offering to engage in a sexual act for hire", see
NMSA 1978, § 30-9-2 (l989)-<lccurs. Cf Cook v. Anding, 2008-NMSC035,117, 144 N.M. 400, 188 PJd 115] (a court interprets a statute "by first
looking to the statute's plain language and giving effect to the plain meaning
ofthe words therein"). The most common definitions of the word "place"
relate to physical space. See httu:ilv,,,,vw.merriamwebster.com/dictionaryiDJaGe (defining "place"). In the definition most
analogous to the wording of Section 30-9-4(A), the Oxford English
Dictionary states:
place, n.

12

tSI Pg

I~-Z~

~m:My~ax

- MarK H. tarnest

IO:KObert J. Gorence

(1~~~Zqq~HHH)

I~:ZI ~~/ZI/IZ

... II. Senses relating to space or location.
" .9.

a. A dwelling, a house; a person's home; ...
b. A building, establishment, or area devoted to a particular
purpose. Usually with qualification indicating the purpose,
as place of amusement, place of resort, bathing-place, etc ....
Petition, Ex. 2(C) at 2-3.
The state argues that the Legislature's 1981 amendment of New
Mexico's prostitution statutes evince a legislative intent for the word "place"
to be construed broadly enough to encompass a website. Petition at 11-12.
However, when Section 31-9-4 was amended to include "places", the
internet was not yet available to the public. It was not until the mid-1990's
that commercial internet providers began offering internet access to the
general public. See Sprint Intern. Commc 'n Corp. v. Dep't ofRevenue, 154
Wash. App. 926, 933, 226 PJd 253 (Wash. App. Div. 22010). Thus, the
1981 Legislature could not have possibly intended to include the internet or
its methods of communication within the meaning of "place where
prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed.,,2 Given this historical
context, it is clear that the Legislature intended only to include buildings and

In response to Judge Whitaker's ruling in this case, Governor Susana
Martinez reportedly called upon the New Mexico Legislature catch up with
the 21 st century and "start looking at those laws and make them more
responsive to the technology today," referring to the relevant statutes as
"outdated" and "old." Russell Contreras, Governor Urges New Prostitution
Legislation, Abq. Journal at Al (June 26, 2012).
2
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businesses similar in nature to houses of prostitutiol1, such as motels and

strip clubs. Cf State v. Hall, 103 N.M. 207, 704 P.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1985)
(defendant convicted of promoting prostitution based on operation of a
"swinger's club"). See also Petition, Ex. 2 at 6-7 (discussing the history of
New Mexico's prostitution statutes).
Not only does the plain language of Section 30-9-4 reject the state's
broad construction, basic principles of statutory construction make clear that
the word "place" is limited to physical establishments. The first of those
principles is ejusdem generis, "that where general words follow words of a
more specific meaning, 'the general words are not construed in their widest
extent but are instead construed as applying to persons or things ofthe same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned.'" State v. Nick R, 2009NMSC-050, 'l21, 147 N.M. 182,218 PJd 868, quoting State v. Foulenfont,
119 N.M. 788, 791, 895 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Ct. App. 1995). In this instance,
the general words "a place where prostitution is practiced, encouraged or
allowed" follow the more specific "house of prostitution" and must be
construed as applying to the same kind or class as that specifically
mentioned; namely a building or other physical structure.
A second principle of statutory construction favors a narrow reading
of the term "place" in the context of Section 30-9-4(A) & (C). When the
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meaning of a statute remains unclear, this Court may "look to other statutes
in pari materia in order to determine legislative intent." United Rentals Nw.,

Inc. v. Yearout Mech., Inc., 201O-NMSC-030, ~ 22, 148 N.M. 426, 237 PJd
728 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This approach "has the
greatest probative force in the case of statutes relating to the same subject
matter passed at the same session of the Legislature." State v. Davis, 2003NMSC-022,

~

12, 134 N.M. 172,74 PJd 1064. Other subsections of30-9-4

and other statutes within the same chapter, make it abundantly clear that the
phrase "a place where prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed"
applies only to physical places, such as strip clubs, bars and motels.
For example, 30-9-4(B) criminalizes "knowingly entering into any
lease or rental agreement for any premises .. , knowing that such premises
are intended for use as a house ofprostitution or as a place where
prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed." (Emphasis added,)

Premises are clearly physical places-such as apartments, houses or other
buildings. See Black's Law Dictionary ("premises". 2. The part of a deed
that describes the land being conveyed, as well as naming the parties and
identifYing relevant facts or explaining the reasons for the deed. 3. A house
or building, along with its grounds."). When read together, the Legislature
clearly intended subsection (A) to reach those individuals who operate
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houses of prostitution and like places, and subsection (B) to reach those
individuals who lease or rent the places for those operations.
Further, other statutes within the prostitution section of the Criminal
Code SUppOit a narrow reading. Section 30-9-3 sets forth the petty
misdemeanor of patronizing prostitutes. That offense ean be committed in
one of two ways:
A. entering or remaining in a house of prostitution or any other place

where prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed with intent to
engage in a sexual act with a prostitute; or
B. knowingly hiring or offering to hire a prostitute, or one believed by
the offeror to be a prostitute, to engage in a sexual act with the actor
or another.
NMSA 1978, § 30-9-3 (1989). Subdivision (A) has language identical to that
in 30-9-4(A). The crime is committed when a person enters or remains in a
designated place with unlawful intent. Subdivision (B), by contrast, is not
place specific, but criminalizes the act of hiring or offering to hire a
prostitute. In other words, subsection A requires that a person be in a
particular place-one in which prostitution is practiced, encouraged or
allowed-whereas subsection B criminalizes the hiring of or the offer to hire
a prostitute to engage in a sexual act, regardless of where or how the hiring
or offer is accomplished. This laller section, nul being place specific, can be
fairly read to criminalize conduct occurring over the internet or the

16

tSI Pg

Z3-Z~

tm:Mytax

MarK H. tarnest

IO:HObert J. Gorence

I~:Z~ ~~/ZI/IZ

m~~Zqq~HHH)

telephone, ifthe elements of the offense otherwise are proven. The former
(subsection A) cannot.

3

Further, Section 30-9-7 describes evidence that is admissible in
prostitution-related proceedings. It provides in relevant part:
In any proceeding under Article 9 or action to abate a public nuisance
under Article 8, testimony about the following circumstances is
admissible in evidence:

the general reputation of the place;
B. the reputation ofthe persons who reside in or frequent the place;

C. the frequency, timing and length ofvisits by nonresidents; and
D. prior convictions of the defendant or persons who reside in or
frequent the place under Sections 9-11, 9-12 and 9-13 of this article or
Sections 40-34-1 through 40-34-5 New Mexico Statutes Annotated,
1953 Compilation, or of any other offense oflike nature wherever
committed.
NMSA 1978, § 30-9-7 (1963) (emphasis added). The use ofthe phrases
"reside in" and "length of visits by nonresidents" indicates the Legislature
understood the word "place" to apply strictly to physical spaces where
prostitution is practiced.
3 The

same is true for section 30-9-4(C), the second provision under which
the state seeks an indictment. Section 30-9-4 criminalizes the procurement of
prostitutes (1) "for a house of prostitution or for a place where prostitution is
practiced, encouraged or allowed" or (2) "for a patron and receiving
compensation therefor." § 30-9-4(C), (F). Thus, the statute targets (1)
brothels or similar places and (2) pimps (which Black's Law Dictionary
defines as "A person who solicits customers for a prostitute, usu. in return
for a share of the prostitute's earnings."). The first provision is place
specific, while the second is not.
17
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Finally, a nuisance statute included in the prostitution section of the
criminal code also makes clear "place" means a physical space:
A. When the public nuisance sought to be abated under the provisions

of Section 30-8-8 NMSA 1978 is a house of prostitution ... the
remedies and presumptions provided in this section apply.
B. For thc pUl'jJoses of this section and Section 30-8-8 NMSA 1978,
two or more convictions of any person or persons occurring at least
one week apart within a period of one year for violation of either
Section 30-9-2 or 30-9-3 NMSA 1978 arising out o/conduct engaged
in at the place described in an abatement action creates a
presumption that the place is a house ofprostitution. ...

C. If ... a binding admission is made by the defendant or the court
concludes that a house of prostitution exists at the location alleged, the
court may, as part of its judgment:
(1) direct the removal from the house ofprostitution all movable
personal property used in conducting the house ofprostitution and

shall direct the sale of that property in the same manner as personal
property is sold when seized under a writ of execution; and
(2) order the closing of the house of prostitution for a period of one
year and prohibit any person entering it ...
NMSA 1978, § 30-8-8.1 (1989). In sum, reading these related statutes in
pari materia evinces a legislative intent to reach only buildings, enclosures

and similar places, and not to reach virtual spaces like web sites and internet
message boards.
The state's hypothetical example underscores the unreasonableness of
its novel interpretation of the relevant statutes. The state argues that a small
shed in which prostitutes and their customers meet to arrange later sexual
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encounters or to exchange money for sexual acts would qualifY as a "place
where prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed." Petition at 11. The
state asks this Court to imagine a bulletin board inside the shed that is used
as a means for prostitutes and their customers to communicate. fd The state
then argues that "[i]fthe bulletin board were moved to a vacant lot, this lot
would become a 'place where prostitution is practiced, encouraged, or
allowed."" fd. (emphasis added). In other words, the state's hypothetical
implicitly recognizes the bulletin board as a means of communication and
not a "place." It is the physical place where the board is kept that may
qualifY as the "place where prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed."
The state also cites to Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557,
558-59 (7th Clr. 1999) as support for its broad reading of the word "place."
The issue in that case was whether an insurance policy that discriminated
against people suffering from AIDS violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). In dicta, the court included a website in its list of "place[s] of
public accommodation," within the meaning of 42 U.S.c. § 12182(a). Doe is
not helpful for several reasons. First, the ADA is a remedial statute enacted
to ensure that people suffering from disabilities would not be discriminated
Dr. Flory and Dr. Garcia question whether the communications described
in the state's hypothetical meet the definition of "prostitution," see NMSA
1978, § 30-9-2, and whether a vacant lot qualfies as a "place," within the
meaning of the statutes, but the Court need not resolve these issues.
4

19

tSI Pg

Zti-Z~

tm:Mytax

MarK H, tarnest

IO:HObert

J,

Gorence

Ib:31

(lb~bZqq~HHH)

~9/ZI/IZ

against Thus, it should be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose, By
contrast, this is a criminal case and an opposite rule of construction applies,
"It has long been part ofthe common law that penal statutes are strictly
construed against the state, and that [a]ny doubts about the construction of
penal statutes must be resolved in favor oflenity," State v, Sung, 2000NMCA-031,

~

15, 128 N,M. 786,999 P.2d 430; see also State v, Ogden, 118

N,M, 234, 242,880 P.2d 845, 853 (1994) ("The rule of lenity counsels that
criminal statutes should be interpreted in the defendant's favor when
insurmountable ambiguity persists regarding the intended scope of a
criminal statute,"), Second, even with the ADA's broad remedial purpose,
several federal courts have held that a "place of accommodation" means a
physical structure or building, See Ford v, Schering-Plough, 145 FJd 601,
612-13 (3d Cir, 1998); Parker v, Metro, Life Ins, Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-

11 (6th Cir, 1997); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp" 198 FJd
1104, 1114-15 (9th Cir, 2000); but see Carparts Dist, Ctr" inc, v, Auto,

Wholesaler's Ass'n a/New Eng" inc., 37 FJd 12 (1st Cir. 1994),
III,

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Real Parties in Interest David C. Flory and
F. Chris Garcia respectfully asks the Court to dismiss the state's petition for

peremptory writ of superintending control.
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